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Irregular migration to Europe by sea, though risky, remains one of the most popular 
migration options for many sub-Saharan Africans. This study examines the determinants of 
irregular migration from West Africa to Europe. We implemented an incentivized lab-in-the-
field experiment in rural Gambia, the country with the region’s highest rate of irregular 
migration to Europe. Male youths aged 15 to 25 were given hypothetical scenarios regarding 
the probability of dying en route to Europe and of gaining legal residence status after 
successful arrival. According to the data we collected, potential migrants overestimate both 
the risk of dying en route to Europe and the probability of obtaining legal residency status. 
In this context, our experimental results show that providing potential migrants with official 
numbers on the probability of getting a legal residence permit decreases their likelihood of 
migration by 2.88 percentage points (pp), while information on the death risk of migrating 
increases their likelihood of migration by 2.29 pp—although the official numbers should be 
regarded as a lower bound to actual mortality. Follow-up data collected one year after the 
experiment show that the migration decisions reported in the lab experiment correlate well 
with actual migration decisions and intentions. Overall, our study indicates that the 




As migrações irregulares para a Europa através do mar continuam a ser uma das formas de 
migração mais ambicionadas por muitos africanos subsarianos. Este estudo analisa as razões 
para as migrações irregulares da África Ocidental para a Europa. Com este objetivo, foi 
implementada uma experiência de laboratório incentivada que teve lugar em zonas rurais da 
Gâmbia - o país com a taxa mais elevada de migrações irregulares para a Europa na África 
Ocidental. Foram apresentados a jovens do sexo masculino, entre os 15 e os 25 anos, 
cenários hipotéticos sobre a probabilidade de se morrer durante a viagem para a Europa, e de 
se conseguir o estatuto legal de residência após uma chegada bem-sucedida. De acordo com 
os dados que recolhemos, os potenciais migrantes sobre-estimam tanto o risco de se morrer 
durante a viagem para a Europa, como a probabilidade de obterem o estatuto legal de 
residência depois de chegarem à Europa. Neste contexto, os nossos resultados experimentais 
mostram que a apresentação de números oficiais relativos à probabilidade de se conseguir 
um título de residência legal diminui a probabilidade de migração em 2.88 pontos 
percentuais (pp), enquanto que informação sobre o risco de morte na migração aumenta a 
sua probabilidade de migração em 2.29pp – apesar de os números oficiais serem 
provavelmente inferiores aos valores reais de mortalidade. Dados de acompanhamento 
recolhidos num inquérito realizado um ano após a experiência, mostram que as decisões 
sobre migração declaradas na experiência de campo correlacionam-se bem com as reais 
decisões e intenções de migração. No geral, o nosso estudo aponta para que as decisões de 
migração dos potenciais migrantes tendem a responder a informação relevante para o seu 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The number of international migrants in the world has been rising, reaching 244 million (3.3 
percent of the world population) in 2015.1 While most people migrate legally, there are large 
and increasing numbers of irregular migrants. Estimates on the total number of irregular 
migrants in the European Union in 2008 range between 1.8 and 8 million.2 These numbers 
increased significantly in recent years with the European Border Agency (FRONTEX) 
recording almost 3 million irregular migrants crossing European borders since 2015. 
Irregular migration is a particularly risky endeavor. Irregular migrants traveling from 
West Africa to Europe typically cross the Sahara Desert to reach Libya, from where they cross 
the Mediterranean to reach Italy—this route is officially called the Central Mediterranean route, 
and it is locally known as the “backway.” In addition to the widely reported deaths in the 
Mediterranean Sea, this journey entails a variety of other serious and more common challenges, 
including death from starvation in the desert, and abductions for ransom, slavery, torture and 
other ill treatment, especially in Libya.3 Between 2000 and 2014, more than 22,400 migrants 
were recorded as having lost their lives trying to reach Europe.4 The number of such deaths has 
been increasing, with 17,390 migrants dying in the Mediterranean between 2014 and 2018.5 
Notwithstanding the risks, the Central Mediterranean route to Europe continues to be the main 
entry point for irregular migrants from Africa. In 2017 alone, 101,448 African migrants were 
recorded as reaching Italy by sea. 
Our work aims at understanding the motives driving individuals to migrate irregularly 
from Western Africa to Europe. For this purpose, we implemented a lab-in-the-field experiment 
among potential migrants in rural Gambia. The irregular emigration rate from The Gambia in 
2009–2017 was 2 percent, making it the West African country with the highest incidence of 
																																								 																				
1 United Nations (2016). “International Migration Report 2015: Highlights” (ST/ESA/SER.A/375). United Nations, 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. 
2 These estimates are notoriously imprecise given the challenges in defining and tracking irregular migrants, as 
discussed by the International Organization for Migration’s World Migration Report 2018.  
3 CNN (2017). “People for Sale: Exposing migrant slave auction sales in Libya.” Last accessed on November 15, 
2018, at https://edition.cnn.com/specials/africa/libya-slave-auctions; Amnesty International (2015). “'Libya is Full 
of Cruelty': Stories of Abduction, Sexual Violence and Abuse from Migrants and Refugees.” Last accessed on 
November 15, 2018, at: http://www.amnesty.eu/content/assets/Reports_and_Briefings_2015/Libya_is_ 
full_of_cruelty.pdf. 
4 Brian, Tara, and Frank Lazcko, 2014. Fatal journeys: Tracking lives lost during migration. International 
Organization for Migration. https://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/pbn/docs/Fatal-Journeys-Tracking-Lives-
Lost-during-Migration-2014.pdf 
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irregular migration relative to its total population.6 Most of these irregular migrants come from 
the rural areas where our project took place. 
In our experiment, sampled males aged 15 to 25 played an incentivized migration game 
designed to elicit willingness to migrate depending on varying chances of dying en route to 
their destination and of obtaining legal residency status. The experiment included sixteen 
rounds, where each round provided a different combination of hypothetical probabilities of 
dying en route and of obtaining legal residency status in Europe upon arrival, with 
corresponding hypothetical wages in Europe fixed depending on the migration circumstances 
faced. In each round, respondents made binary decisions about whether to migrate to Italy or 
stay in Gambia. They also reported their willingness to pay for the migration cost (out of their 
game endowment) and decided on how large a payment they were willing to accept in order to 
forgo migrating. While one of the rounds provided factual information on the risk of dying en 
route and the chances of obtaining residence status, this was unknown to respondents. 
Our data show that potential migrants overestimate both the chances of dying en route 
and of obtaining a legal residence permit: their expected probability of dying en route is 30 pp 
higher than the official numbers, while the expected chances of obtaining a residence permit 
are 7 pp higher than the actual probability. Our experimental counterfactual results predict that 
providing potential migrants with accurate information on the probability of obtaining a legal 
residence permit would decrease their likelihood of migration by 2.88 pp, while receiving 
official numbers on the death risk of irregular migration would increase their likelihood of 
migration by 2.29 pp, although the official numbers we provided should be regarded as lower 
bounds to actual death risks. Overall, our study suggests that in making migration decisions, 
potential migrants may actively respond to information about relevant facts regarding the costs 
and benefits of migration.  
In order to evaluate the credibility of the (incentivized) migration decisions made in the 
context of our lab-in-the-field experiment, we collected follow-up data one year after the 
experiment. Our analysis of these data showed that decisions in the lab correlated well with 
actual international migration decisions and intentions one year after the experiment. In 
																																								 																				





	 	 Bah and Batista   3 
addition, we find that lab decisions are positively correlated with the expected net benefit of 
migration computed for each round. 
This paper contributes to the limited existing academic economics literature on irregular 
migration. While we are not the first to use experimental techniques to study the willingness to 
migrate, our work is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to implement a lab-in-the-field 
experiment aimed at examining the determinants of irregular migration. 
Our methodological contribution is related to a small number of recent studies on 
international migration utilizing lab experiments. Batista and McKenzie (2018) conduct an 
incentivized laboratory experiment to test various theories of migration departing from the 
neoclassical migration model of net expected income maximization, considering also additional 
and more realistic factors such as migrant-skill self-selection, credit constraints, incomplete 
information, and multiple destination choices. Using a sample of potential migrants (graduating 
university students in Kenya and Portugal), the results suggest that adding these realistic 
features, especially uncertainty and imperfect information, to the neoclassical model brings 
migration decisions to levels much more consistent with reality than the ones implied by 
simpler income maximization considerations. In a recent complementary piece of work, 
Barnett-Howell (2018) used a migration video game in a lab experiment to examine how 
individuals in the United States and Ethiopia make migration choices. He also found an 
important role for imperfect information in explaining lack of movement. Relatedly, Lagakos et 
al. (2018) conducted a discrete choice experiment in Bangladesh to understand the relative 
weights people place on migration-related factors such as the quality of living, relative to wages 
or family separation, in making internal migration decisions. Their setup allows respondents to 
hypothetically choose between staying put or migrating under two different scenarios. The 
options vary in terms of wages, unemployment rates, and amenities at destination (namely, 
availability of a latrine facility and regularity of family contacts). This study shows that 
unemployment risk and housing conditions are important determinants of (internal) migration 
decisions, while family separation seems to act as less of a deterrent to rural-urban migration. In 
our work, we follow this line of research in that we use an incentivized lab-in-the-field 
experiment to test for relevant determinants of the willingness to migrate, although our focus is 
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their migration journey. Nevertheless, our results are consistent with these prior studies in that 
lower expected benefits decrease the willingness to migrate. 
Our work is also closely related to the role of information in determining 
international migration. The contributions of Shrestha (2019, 2020) highlight the importance 
of access to information for potential migrants’ expectations and their subsequent migration 
decisions. Shrestha (2019) offers evidence on how the deaths of migrants in a district affect 
subsequent migration decisions for up to twelve months. He argues that migrants are not 
fully informed on migration risks and thus update their beliefs after the occurrence of deaths 
of migrants from their district. Furthermore, Shrestha (2020) conducted a randomized field 
experiment providing information on mortality rates during the migration journey and 
documented how this information affected subsequent migration decisions in Nepal. More 
specifically, and consistent with our own findings, these experimental findings show that 
providing information on migration-related mortality rates and on wages at destination is 
effective in changing expectations, especially for less experienced migrants. Relatedly, 
Dunsch et al. (2019) and Bah et al. (2019) conducted two randomized controlled 
experiments providing information to potential irregular migrants. Dunsch et al. (2019) 
randomly invited potential migrants to the screening in Dakar, Senegal, of a video 
documentary about migrant returnees. The research showed that potential migrants who 
participated in the screening were more likely to be informed about the risks and returns of 
irregular migration and less likely than those in the placebo group to express an intention to 
migrate. Similarly, Bah et al. (2019) use a sample of 4,000 potential migrants in rural 
Gambia to document that those who viewed a video documentary about migration to Europe 
and Senegal are more knowledgeable about the risks of irregular migration. 
Although the phenomenon of irregular migration from Africa to Europe has attracted 
much media attention lately, most economics literature has focused on irregular migration 
from Mexico to the United States and particularly on the consequences of immigration 
policies on these irregular migration flows. Orrenius and Zavodny (2003) show no long-term 
impact for amnesty programs on the flow of undocumented migrants. Gathmann (2008) 
shows that stricter border control increased the price of border smugglers (‘coyotes’) by 17 
percent, while the demand for smugglers remained unchanged. The strongest effect of 
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Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2013) showed that tougher immigration measures such as E-Verify 
(a mandate obliging employers to check the work authorization of employees) impacted 
deportation fears and interstate mobility and reduced deportees’ intentions to return to the 
US. Similarly, Amuedo-Dorantes and Lozano (2014) showed that Arizona’s SB1070 law, 
which made it a crime for an alien not to carry proper documentation, had little effect on the 
share of undocumented immigrants. While rather specific to the context of Mexico-US 
irregular migration flows, the findings provided by this literature are consistent with our 
results in that they highlight the role of policy constraints shaping the riskiness of irregular 
migration as important determinants of migration decisions.  
There are only a few studies that examine the willingness to migrate irregularly from 
West Africa. In their research, Arcand and Mbaye (2013) and Mbaye (2014) use data from a 
survey of about 400 individuals in Dakar to offer important contributions to the 
understanding of irregular migration from Senegal. Mbaye (2014) shows that potential 
migrants are willing to accept a high risk of dying en route and that they are mostly young, 
single, and poorly educated. Moreover, she argues that the cost of irregular migration, 
migrant networks, high expectations, and tight immigration policies significantly explain the 
willingness to migrate irregularly. Arcand and Mbaye (2013) study how individual risk-
aversion and time preferences affect the willingness to migrate irregularly and to pay for 
smuggling services. They find that the willingness to pay for a smuggler is an increasing 
function of an individual’s intertemporal discount rate and a decreasing function of risk-
aversion. More recently, Friebel et al. (2018) study the impact of distance on individual 
intentions to migrate from Africa to Europe. Using the demise of the Gaddafi regime in 2011 
as an exogenous source of variation that affects the distance from Africa to Europe due to an 
increase in the usage of the central Mediterranean route (Libya to Italy), they found negative 
effects of distance on intentions to migrate. The effect is especially larger for educated youth 
with a migration network. Our paper builds on these contributions by offering additional 
evidence on the importance of the probability of dying en route and of gaining legal status in 
shaping the willingness to migrate irregularly. Moreover, our incentivized lab-in-the-field 
experiment provides us with additional variation (relative to cross-section survey analysis) to 
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us to use within-individual variation to compare what would have happened to the 
willingness to migrate irregularly from one specific scenario to another.  
Understanding the determinants of the willingness to migrate may have important 
consequences on economic development. Batista et al. (2012), for example, show that the 
probability of own future migration has important positive effects on educational attainment 
in Cape Verde—even on those individuals that end up not actually emigrating. The evidence 
suggests that a 10-pp increase in the probability of own future migration increases the 
probability of completing intermediate secondary education by 4-pp for individuals who do 
not migrate. Additionally, Docquier et al. (2014) show a strong correlation between the 
intention to migrate and subsequent actual migration. Consistent with their findings, the data 
from the follow-up survey we conducted one year after the experiment also point to both 
actual migration decisions and intentions correlating well with the lab migration decisions 
taken one year earlier. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the country context 
in which we conduct our analysis. Section 3 discusses the survey and sampling framework, 
the lab-in-the-field experiment, and descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the econometric 
approach and main empirical results. Section 5 presents some robustness checks using 
follow up data on actual migration decisions and intentions measured one year after the lab 
experiment. Section 5 offers concluding remarks. 
2.  COUNTRY TEXT 
 
Sandwiched by Senegal, The Gambia is the smallest country in mainland Africa with a 
population of 2 million people. In 2017, the country had an estimated GDP per capita of 
$1700, ranking 176 out of 190 countries, one of the poorest in the world. Over the last 
decade, the country recorded an average growth rate of 2.8 percent per year.7 
Politically, since independence from the United Kingdom in 1965, the country has had three 
presidents: Dawda Jawara (1965–1994), Yaya Jammeh (1994–2016), and Adama Barrow 
(2016–present). Jammeh ousted Jawara in a bloodless coup, but in December 2016, 
Jammeh's 22-year rule ended with Barrow's electoral victory, making it the country’s first 
democratic transition.  
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Migration is an important phenomenon in The Gambia. Emigration is a cornerstone 
of the Gambian economy, with remittances amounting to almost 20 percent of GDP, which 
is equivalent to the whole contribution of the tourism sector to GDP.8 The country also 
attracts many regional immigrants, mostly from Senegal. According to the 2013 census, 
international immigrants correspond to 6 percent of the population, while rural to urban 
migrants account for 7 percent.  
Europe is the main international migration destination for many Gambians, who 
mostly emigrate irregularly—through the “backway.”9 The most popular “backway” 
migration route from Gambia is currently the Libya route, also known as the Central 
Mediterranean route. This route entails travelling from Gambia through Senegal, Mali, and 
Niger, and from there to Libya, as illustrated in Figure 1. There are no visa requirements for 
Gambians to enter these transit countries. Illegal smuggling typically starts in Niger to reach 
Libya. Before the fall of the Gaddafi regime, many African migrants opted for Libya as a 
destination country with many job opportunities. However, the 2011 Libyan civil war 
destabilized the region, subsequently turning Libya into a transit magnet for many economic 
migrants and refugees. Presently, this route is the riskiest option for many African migrants, 
who in Libya face risks of maltreatment such as physical abuse, kidnapping, and slavery.10  
  
																																								 																				
8 World Bank Migration and Remittances Factbook 2016. Last accessed on November 15, 2018, at: 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/23743. 
9 The Gambia Labour Force Survey (2018) shows that 63 percent of international emigrants from The Gambia 
migrated irregularly. The representative survey covers 6260 households from 313 enumeration areas nationwide. 








IRREGULAR MIGRATION ROUTES FROM THE GAMBIA TO ITALY 
 
 
Source: Gene Thorp, The Washington Post  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/world/2015/06/14/tiny-gambia-has-a-big-export-migrants-
desperate-to-reach-europe/ [Last accessed on Jun 3, 2020.] 
 
 
Notwithstanding the risks, the Central Mediterranean route to Europe continues to be the 
main entry point of irregular migrants from Africa. According to 2018 figures from FRONTEX, 
101,448 African migrants were recorded as reaching Italy by sea in 2017 alone. As shown in 
Figure 2, about 8,500 Gambians were detected arriving in Europe by sea in 2017, which 
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country with the largest incidence of irregular migrants to Europe. Note that from 2009 to 2017 
the number of Gambian irregular migrants entering Europe was recorded as 43,400, 






TOTAL FLOW OF MIGRANTS TAKING THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN ROUTE IN 






3.1 Survey and Sampling Framework 
 
The survey data used in our work were collected using a representative sample of 406 
households living in rural villages in the Upper River Region (URR) of The Gambia. 
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country’s population and has the highest share of irregular migrants relative to working 
population in the country—more than 5 percent.  
The 60 sampled enumeration areas (EAs) were randomly chosen from a population 
of 526 EAs using population size proportional sampling based on The Gambia’s 2013 
census. In each enumeration area, a random sample of ten eligible households was drawn. 
Eligibility was determined by asking whether a young man aged 15–25 belonged to the 
household.11 If the household had more than one youth within the eligible age range, one 
would be randomly selected. In each of these households, after surveying the household 
head, the sampled young males were also surveyed.  
The households were sampled using a simple random walk within each EA. 
Enumerators surveyed every nth household, where the nth household depended on the size of 
the EA. Once they sampled the nth household, the participation criterion of the household 
was ascertained by asking whether the household had at least one young man aged 15–25 
years. Households that did not satisfy this criterion were replaced by the geographically 
closest household to the right. Following this sampling procedure, 595 households were 
finally surveyed. Out of these households, a sample of 584 male youths were also surveyed, 
of which 406 participated in the experiment. Initially, enumerators were instructed to pick 
every second household to participate in the experiment. However, this strategy was 
subsequently discarded to allow one sampled youth to participate in each household. The 
fieldwork took place in May 2017. 
 
3.2 Lab-in-the-Field Experiment 
The experiment was implemented as a simple lab-in-the-field game in which participants 
were hypothetically endowed with 100,000 Gambian Dalasis (GMD).12 We frame the 
participants’ decisions as migration decisions with a 10-year time horizon. The precise 
framing of the experiment to players is provided in Appendix A1. 
The experimental subjects must play 16 different rounds of an incentivized game in 
which migration-related decisions must be made, depending on different combinations of four 
																																								 																				
11 Young men only were included in our sample because 99 percent of irregular Gambian emigrants are male 
according to the 2018 Gambia Labor Force Survey. 
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different scenarios for the probability of dying en route to the migration destination and for the 
probability of obtaining legal residence status at the destination.  
 The four scenarios in the games were 0, 10, 20, and 50 percent probability of dying on 
the migration route, and 0, 33, 50, and 100 percent probability of obtaining a legal residence 
permit or asylum status at destination.  
 These numbers were determined based on data from our pilot survey, and other official 
databases described as follows. According to the International Organization for Migration, from 
January to December 2016, 181,436 migrants arrived in Italy by sea, while 4,581 migrants lost 
their lives.13 These figures provide a lower bound for the mortality rate at sea, estimated at 2.46 
percent deaths of all attempted migration journeys by sea. In addition, we obtained the 
probability of dying en route by adding the probability of dying en route before reaching the 
sea. The 2017 North Africa Mixed Migration Hub survey reports the incidence of cases where 
migrants report dead bodies along the way (including the Sahara Desert, Libya, and 
Mediterranean Sea).14 According to the data from the January 2017 survey, 44 percent of 
respondents reported witnessing one or more dead in Libya, 38 percent in the Sahara, 15 percent 
at sea, and 3 percent in transit countries such as Niger. Combining the probability of dying at 
sea of 2.5 percent and the incidences of witnessing migrant deaths en route of 15 percent, we 
estimated the overall probability of dying en route as 17.5 percent. In the experiment, we use 20 
percent as a proxy that approximates the actual death rate over the migration route given the 
likely undercount of fatalities. The game’s 50 percent threshold for the probability of dying 
matches expectation data from our pilot survey. The pilot survey we conducted previously to 
the experiment elicited the expected probability of dying for 20 young males aged 15 to 25 from 
the region of the study. On average, the respondents expect that 5 out of 10 Gambians die along 
the “backway,” corresponding to a 50 percent probability of dying.  
 The official data on residence permits is obtained from the Asylum Information 
Database (AIDA, 2016).15 This database contains detailed information on numbers of migrants 
who arrive in Italy by nationality and by destination, who applied for asylum, and the final 
																																								 																				
13 International Organization for Migration (2017). “Mixed Migration of Flows in the Mediterranean and Beyond: 
Compilation of Available Data and Information - Reporting Period 2016.” 
http://migration.iom.int/docs/2016_Flows_to_Europe_Overview.pdf. 
14 North Africa Mixed Migration Hub (2017). “Survey Snapshot, Italy.”	
15 Asylum Information Database (AIDA) 2016. “Country Report: Italy.” European Council on Refugees and Exiles 
(ECRE). https://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/report-download/aida_it_2016update.pdf. Last 
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decision on the applications. We chose Italy because it is the main entry country in Europe for 
Gambian migrants, as described in Section 2. In 2016, 8,930 migrants originating from The 
Gambia applied for asylum status in Italy. The rejection rate for these migrants was 67.5 
percent. Using this rate, we estimate the probability of obtaining asylum status or a residence 
permit at 33 percent.  
 We therefore combined these two estimates (the first based on existing data and the 
second based on expectations from the pilot data) and two other extreme but interesting cases (0 
and 10 percent chance of dying and 0 and 100 percent chance of obtaining residence or asylum 
status) to obtain the rounds for the game. For each round in the game, respondents were given 
showcards (shown in Figure A1 in the appendices) visually illustrating probabilities of dying en 
route and of obtaining residence status. Note that all rounds were framed as hypothetical 
scenarios and respondents were not informed that one of the rounds included the actual risk of 
dying and chance of obtaining a residence/asylum permit. 
 In addition, information on the corresponding migrant wages was provided as part of the 
experiment. Based on a small pilot survey conducted in Italy among Gambian irregular migrants 
residing in the Siracusa and Catania regions, we consider that, once migrants successfully reach 
Europe, they face two possible wages: EUR 1000 for those with legal residence status, and EUR 
500 for those without permits. This setting is consistent with the findings of Dustmann et al. 
(2017), who show that undocumented migrants consumed about 40 percent less than 
documented migrants in Italy, and about one quarter of these differences in consumption is due 
to undocumented migrants earning less than documented migrants.  
 In each round, given the respective information provided verbally by the interviewer and 
visually by the showcard given to the experimental subject, participants had to make three 
decisions: (1) willingness to migrate, (2) willingness to pay for the cost of migration using the 
endowment provided, and (3) willingness to be paid in order to forgo migrating. The order of 
the 16 rounds was randomized.  
Once the experimental subjects finished playing the game, their payoffs within the game 
were determined by randomly selecting one of the rounds played. In the selected round, the 
payout was made using the corresponding probabilities. Using our survey data, we found the 
average payoff payment was GMD 100, equivalent to the pay for two days’ work. This relevant 
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subjects to seriously consider the decisions made in the game. Note that while the hypothetical 
wages are fixed across rounds, the expected payoffs vary across rounds. For example, the 
expected payoff in terms of wages in a round with 0 percent probability of dying and 0 percent 
probability of obtaining residence/asylum permit corresponds to EUR 250. Similarly, the round 
with 0 percent probability of dying and a 100 percent probability of obtaining residence/asylum 
permit corresponds to an expected monthly wage of EUR 1000. The expected wage was not 
specifically indicated in each round; only hypothetical endowment, wages, and the number of 
deaths and asylum permits granted per 10 migrants were shown. 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics  
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the data on the 406 sampled young males who 
participated in the experiment. On average, the interviewed youth is 20 years old with a 
monthly income of GMD 2,061. In terms of formal education, 32 percent of the young men 
have some formal education with an average of eight years of education, and 38 percent of the 
respondents reported they had already migrated outside their village for more than six months. 
The duration of the migration spell averages 23 months. Almost all of the sampled young (82 
percent) know at least one person (be it a relative, a family member, or a friend) who has 
migrated outside the country (migration network). On average, the size of the migration 
network is 2.8 per respondent. We also elicited data on the number of migrants known by the 
respondent who successfully travelled to Europe through the “backway” and also the number of 
people who died along the way. The data indicates that on average respondents know 11 
persons who successfully reached Europe through the “backway,” and an average of 3.7 persons 









SUMMARY STATISTICS OF SAMPLED PARTICIPANTS IN THE EXPERIMENT 
 
Variable Mean SD No of Obs. 
Individual characteristics 
Age 
Formal education [Yes=1, No=0] 
Years of formal education (if any) 
Monthly income (GMD) 
Has migrated before [Yes=1, No=0] 
Duration of migration (if any) in months 
Has relatives or friends abroad (migration network) [Yes=1, No=0] 
No. of relatives or friends (youth with migration network) 
No. of known successful migrants 
No. of known dead migrants en route 
Has intention of migrating within the country 
Has intention of migrating outside the country [Yes=1, No=0] 
Has intention of migrating irregularly [Yes=1, No=0] 






Monthly value required to forgo migrating (EUR) 
Expected cost of migration (GMD) 
Expected monthly wage in destination (EUR) 
Expected probability of dying en route 




Household head age 
Household size 
Has internal migrants [Yes=1, No=0] 
Has international migrants [Yes=1, No=0] 









































































































Data on willingness or intention to migrate both internally and externally were elicited. 
To measure willingness to migrate, we asked the following question: Ideally, if you have the 
opportunity, are you willing to migrate elsewhere inside The Gambia? This question 
corresponds to intention or willingness to migrate internally. For those who answered in the 
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migrate outside The Gambia was elicited in a similar way. The results from the data indicate an 
overwhelming majority of 82 percent willing to migrate within The Gambia while 91 percent of 
the respondents expressed a willingness to migrate outside The Gambia. The magnitude of these 
statistics highlights the fact that most young males aged 15 to 25 years desire to migrate and 
live elsewhere, outside their current settlements. Similarly, to elicit willingness to migrate 
irregularly, we ask the following question: Ideally, if you have the opportunity, are you willing 
to migrate through the “backway”/irregular way? We used the term “backway” as the irregular 
migration route is commonly known as such in the Gambia. Almost half of the sampled young 
(47 percent) responded in the affirmative. The top five intended destinations are Italy (29 
percent), Germany (27 percent), Spain (16 percent), the United States (6 percent), and the 
United Kingdom (4 percent). These statistics are consistent with the current top destination 
countries of migrants from The Gambia. In addition to their intended destination, we collected 
information on expected cost of migrating, expected monthly wages in their destination country, 
and how much they were willing to accept per month in order to forgo migrating. The average 
expected cost of migration amounts to GMD 85,394 (more than EUR 1500). In order to forgo 
migrating, respondents on average are willing to accept GMD 28,370 (about EUR 525) per 
month. This indicates that young males are willing to accept a substantial risk of dying en route 
instead of receiving a substantial amount compared to their current monthly earnings. This is in 
line with their average expected wage of EUR 1,478 per month in Europe, which corresponds to 
more than GMD 70,000. 
We also elicited further expectations from our sample. Specifically, in addition to the 
expected cost of migrating, expected wage at destination, and willingness to forgo migrating 
irregularly, we elicited the expected probability of dying en route and the expected probability 
of obtaining a residence or asylum permit. Expected probabilities were collected using the 
following simple questions: Out of every ten Gambian migrants, how many people do you think 
die on the way migrating to Europe through the “backway”/irregular way? Out of every ten 
Gambian migrants, how many people do you think obtain residence or refugee status in 
Europe? The answers to these questions represent the expected probabilities of dying en route 
and obtaining residence or asylum status. On average, respondents estimate at respectively 49 
percent and 40 percent the probabilities of dying en route and of obtaining a permit. According 
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while the probability of obtaining a permit is 33 percent, indicating that our experimental 
subjects substantially overestimate, on average, the risk of dying en route, while also 
overestimating the probability of obtaining residence status. These expectation biases should be 
taken with some caution, as the official estimates are not only prone to measurement error,16 but 
they are also averages over individuals, whereas our respondents may have relevant individual 
information that makes their expectations less biased than an average comparison may suggest. 
Furthermore, we elicited time and risk preferences. Respondents were asked how much 
they are willing to invest in a lottery with a 50 percent chance of doubling their investment and 
a 50 percent chance of losing half out of a GMD 1,000 hypothetical endowment. The 
percentage of the endowment they were willing to invest in the lottery is our proxy for risk 
preference. On average, respondents were willing to invest 38 percent of the GMD 1,000 
endowment. Similarly, to elicit time preferences, we asked respondents to suppose they had 
won GMD 100,000 in a lottery, and that they could choose either to wait for one year to be paid 
the full amount, or pay to receive the amount immediately at the cost of a fraction of the lottery 
value. Using this information, the discount factor can be calculated as one minus the fraction 
they are willing to pay to receive the money immediately. The average discount factor is 0.90. 
See Appendix A2 for the exact framing of the risk and time preference elicitation questions. 
Who are those young men willing to migrate irregularly and who are those not willing to 
migrate? Table 2 provides brief summary statistics on these groups of people. Out of the 406 
sampled young males, 370 (91 percent) express willingness to migrate outside the country, 
while the remaining 63 have no intention to migrate. However, out of the more that 90 percent 
wishing to migrate, only a lesser fraction (46 percent) are willing to migrate irregularly. This 
raw statistic is consistent with Mbaye (2014). Aspiring irregular migrants are relatively 
younger, with an average age of 19.92 years compared to 20.28 years for those not willing to 
migrate irregularly. Those who are willing to migrate irregularly have 8.46 years of education 
compared to 8.56 for those not willing to migrate irregularly. In addition, the former earn an 
average monthly income of GMD 1,517 compared to an average of GMD 2,130.21 for the 
latter. While the share of individuals with past migration experience is the same in both groups 
																																								 																				
16 As discussed before, these estimates, particularly those on the death risk of irregular migration, are likely to 
suffer from measurement error. For example, the expected probability of dying is calculated based on body counts 
and reports from witnesses of deaths en route. The probability of obtaining legal migration status upon arrival is 
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(38 percent), potential irregular migrants have more migration experience in terms of number of 
months than those unwilling to migrate irregularly (24.8 versus 21.6 months). In addition, both 
groups share the same fraction (82 percent) of having a migration network; however, those 
willing to migrate irregularly have a larger average network of 3.01 persons versus 2.76 for 
those not willing to migrate irregularly. Furthermore, potential irregular migrants know on 
average more people who successfully migrated irregularly (11.6) compared to those not willing 
to migrate irregularly (8.3). Looking at the number of people known by the two groups who lost 
their lives en route, we observe those who are not willing to migrate irregularly know more 
people who lost their lives en route to Europe compared to potential irregular migrants (3.83 
versus 3.67). The expected probability of dying en route for those willing to migrate irregularly 
averages 45 percent compared to 53 percent for those unwilling to do so. This implies that while 
both groups expect a higher probability of dying compared to the actual estimated probability 
(20 percent), those willing to migrate irregularly expect a lower risk of dying. Finally, potential 
irregular migrants expect a higher chance of obtaining residence status (47 percent versus 33 
percent for those unwilling to migrate irregularly), and they are on average willing to invest 44 
percent of their hypothetical endowment (versus 32 percent for those not willing to migrate 









SUMMARY STATISTICS: TEST OF STATISTICAL DIFFERENCES 
 
Variable Willing to 
migrate 
irregularly 






N=189 N=226 N=406 
Mean    SD Mean    SD P-value 
Individual characteristics 
Age 
Years of formal education (if any) 
Monthly income (GMD) 
Has migrated before [Yes=1, No=0] 
Duration of migration (if any) in months 
Has relatives or friends abroad (migration network) 
[Yes=1, No=0] 
No. of relatives or friends (youth with migration network) 
No. of known successful migrants 
No. of known migrants dead en route 
Has intention of migrating within the country 
Has intention of migrating outside the country [Yes=1, 
No=0] 
Expected probability of dying en route 




Household head age 
Household size 
Has internal migrants [Yes=1, No=0] 
Has international migrants [Yes=1, No=0] 































































































































4. ECONOMETRIC APPROACH AND MAIN EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1. Estimation Strategy 
 
In order to analyze how the probability of successfully reaching Italy and the probability of 
obtaining a legal residence permit affect migration-related outcomes such as the willingness 
to migrate, the willingness to pay for migration, and the willingness to be paid to forgo 
migrating, we can estimate the following model: 
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where O denotes our three outcomes of interest: willingness to migrate, to pay, and to forgo 
migrating. PD is the probability of dying en route and PP is the probability of obtaining a 
permit. δi	represents individual fixed effects and	θr	is round order fixed effects. Our	estimates 
of interest are β1 and	β2.:  β1 gives us the effect of probability of success on the three outcomes, 
while β2  gives us the effect of the probability of obtaining a residence permit on our 
outcomes of interest. The advantage of our design is that due to the two sources of 
variation—both within individuals and across individuals—we can include individual fixed 
effects that will allow us to control for potential individual time-invariant omitted variables.	
 
4.2. Empirical Results 
 
a. Main results: Willingness to migrate irregularly 
Table 3 below shows the regression results from the lab-in-the-field experiment. 
Respondents were given different hypothetical information about the probability of dying en 
route and the probability of obtaining a residence permit and wages in the destination 
country. Given this hypothetical information, they made hypothetical decisions to migrate 
irregularly or not. Thus, the dependent variable is whether individuals are willing to migrate 
irregularly or not. We are interested in understanding how different factors affect decisions 
to migrate irregularly or not, with special interest in the probabilities of dying en route and 
of obtaining an asylum or residence permit. 
We present results from a linear probability model with various specifications. 
Irrespective of the specifications, we observe that increasing the probability of dying en 
route reduces the probability of individuals’ willingness to migrate. The coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. On the other hand, the chance of obtaining a 
residence or asylum permit is positively correlated with the odds of migrating. This implies 
that potential migrants care about the likelihood of obtaining asylum status once they reach 
Europe. Columns (1) and (3) provide parsimonious correlations, while columns (2) and (4) 










WILLINGNESS TO MIGRATE IRREGULARLY: RESULTS FROM THE EXPERIMENT 
 



























Constant 0.3609*** 0.3491*** 0.4638*** 0.3951*** 
 
Individual fixed effects 























R-squared 0.0236 0.8200 0.1667 0.5462 
Notes: Regressions estimated using a Linear Probability Model. Migrate irregularly is a binary variable taking value 
1 if the respondent is willing to migrate irregularly and 0 otherwise. Prob. of permit is the hypothetical probability of 
obtaining a residence permit (or asylum status) in Italy. Prob. of dying is the hypothetical probability of dying en 
route to Italy. N represents the total number of observations and n is the total number of respondents. Each 
individual has a maximum of 16 observations (rounds). In columns (3) and (4), estimation is conducted by dropping 
experimental subjects who are willing to migrate in all rounds (102) and those that are not willing to migrate in any 
round (189). Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level. *Significant at 10 percent; 
**significant at 5 percent; ***significant at 1 percent.  
 
 
In column (1) of Table 3, the results show that a 1 percent increase in the probability 
of obtaining a residence permit increases the willingness to migrate by 0.19 pp, highlighting 
that potential migrants care about the likelihood of obtaining residence permit once they 
reach Europe. Similarly, increasing the hypothetical mortality rate by 1 percent reduces the 
willingness to migrate irregularly by 0.16 pp. Once we control for both individual and round 
order fixed effects in column 2, the magnitude of effect reduces to 0.13 percent for the 
residence permit effect and 0.12 percent for the mortality effect. Note that this magnitude is 
very similar to the 0.15 pp mortality effect estimated by Shrestha (2020) in Nepal.  
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 3, we restrict the sample by dropping respondents who 
never choose to migrate and those who always migrate irrespective of the round. The resulting 
estimates double in magnitude. The coefficient on the legal permit increases to 0.42 pp, while 
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The experimental setup allows us to evaluate changes in the willingness to migrate if 
potential migrants had accurate information about the chances of dying en route and obtaining 
residence permits. Table 4 presents results comparing the willingness to migrate of 
experimental subjects when moving from their current expectations about migration risks to 
different probabilities of dying en route and of obtaining legal residence status. Column (1) of 
table 4 shows that the expected 50 percent probability of dying en route and the 50 percent 
probability of obtaining a residence permit corresponds to 37 percent of all experimental 
subjects being willing to migrate, and 47 percent when including only the experimental subjects 
in the responsive sub-sample.  
As is reported in column (1) of Table 4, we find that reducing the probability of dying to 
0 percent increases the likelihood of migrating by 6.5 pp and increasing the probability of 
obtaining a permit to 100 percent increases migration by 3.7 pp.  
Recall that (based on the official numbers described above) the actual probability of 
dying en route is 20 percent and the probability of obtaining a legal residence permit is 30 
percent. Our results suggest that knowing the probability of dying en route is 20 percent instead 
of the average 50 percent expectation increases migration by 2.3 pp. Similarly, adjusting the 
probability of obtaining a residence permit from 50 percent to 30 percent reduces migration by 
2.9 pp. The difference between these coefficients is statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. 
Column (2) in Table 4 shows that the willingness to migrate of responsive experimental 
subjects is reduced by 9.4 pp when moving from the 50 percent expected probability to the 
actual 30 percent probability of obtaining a permit. In the same way, we observe that the 
willingness to migrate increases by 7 pp when the probability of dying en route changes from 
the expected probability of 50 percent to the 20 percent actual probability of dying en route. 










WILLINGNESS TO MIGRATE IRREGULARLY: RESULTS FROM THE EXPERIMENT 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Migrate Irregularly Migrate Irregularly 
0% prob. of permit -0.0985*** -0.3154*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0370) 
   

























Constant 0.3745*** 0.4742*** 
 
Individual fixed effects 













R2 0.8219 0.8157 
Notes: Regressions estimated using a Linear Probability Model. Migrate irregularly is a binary variable taking value 
1 if the respondent is willing to migrate irregularly and 0 otherwise. Prob. of permit is the hypothetical probability of 
obtaining a residence permit (or asylum status) in Italy. Prob. of dying is the hypothetical probability of dying en 
route to Italy. N represents the total number of observations and n is the total number of respondents. Each individual 
has a maximum of 16 observations (rounds). The omitted category corresponds to the average expected probabilities 
of dying en route (50 percent) and of obtaining a permit (50 percent). In column (2), estimation is conducted by 
dropping those who are willing to migrate in all rounds (102) and those that are not willing to migrate in any round 
(189). Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level. *Significant at 10 percent; **significant at 5 
percent; ***significant at 1 percent.  
 
 
Table 5 describes predictors of the experimental subjects’ responsiveness (in terms of 
migration decisions) to the information provided in the various rounds of the lab experiment. 
Column (1) in Table 5 describes how individuals who choose to never migrate in any of the 
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migrants who died en route to Europe. They tend to have relatively low expectations regarding 
the probability of obtaining a residence permit and expect that the probability of dying en route 
is relatively high. They are substantially more risk averse than individuals who migrate in at 
least some of the experimental rounds. Column (2) shows a different story for experimental 
subjects who responded to the varying information provided across the different experimental 
rounds: these responsive subjects know few past migrants who died in route to Europe, and had 
relatively high expectations regarding the probability of obtaining a legal residence permit. 
Finally, column (3) of Table 5 showed that subjects who do not respond to the information 
provided in the different experimental rounds because they always chose to migrate tend to have 






PREDICTORS OF EXPERIMENTAL SUBJECTS’ RESPONSIVENESS TO INFORMATION 
PROVIDED IN THE LAB EXPERIMENT 
 
 (1) (3) (2) 
 Never Migrate Migrate Always Migrate Sometimes 
No. of known migrants -0.0064*** 0.0034 0.0030 
 (0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0024) 
    









Expected permit -0.0490*** -0.0005 0.0495*** 
 (0.0079) (0.0081) (0.0088) 
    
Expected dead 0.0252** -0.0187* -0.0065 
 (0.0095) (0.0083) (0.0092) 
    
Risk preference -0.2848*** 0.1067 0.1781* 
 (0.0816) (0.0737) (0.0813) 
    
Constant 0.5120*** 0.4325** 0.0555 
 (0.1449) (0.1447) (0.1356) 
N 359 359 359 
Notes: Regressions estimated using a Linear Probability Model. Never migrate is binary variable taking value 1 if 
respondent is not willing to migrate in all rounds and 0 otherwise. Migrate sometimes is binary variable taking 
value 1 if respondent expressed willingness to migrate in some rounds and 0 otherwise. Migrate always is binary 
variable taking value 1 if respondent is willing to migrate in all rounds and 0 otherwise. No. of known migrants is 
the number of known migrants who migrated, No. of known dead migrants is the number of known “backway” 
migrants who died en route to Italy. Expected permit is the expected probability of obtaining a residence/asylum 
permit. Expected dead is the expected probability of dying en route to Italy. Risk preference is measured as 
willingness to take a gamble (see Appendix A1 for the precise question phrasing). Robust standard errors in the 
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b. Heterogeneous Effects: Expectations 
One alternative interpretation of the migration choices made by potential migrants in our lab 
experiment is that they do not necessarily reflect migration decisions, and they can instead 
simply translate the experimental subjects’ preferences for risky behavior. The implication is 
that lab decisions would perhaps be similar if framed in a different context, such as tobacco use 
or gambling. In this section, we examine the robustness of our main empirical findings by 
presenting how experimental migration decisions vary with expectations about the probability 
of dying during the irregular migration journey, as well as expectations about the probability of 
acquiring legal status after successful arrival in Europe. These results show how these 
migration-related expectations are significantly linked to the migration decisions made in the 
experiment. 
Results in Tables 6A and 6B illustrate how, in addition to the expected effects of the 
probabilities of dying en route and of obtaining a legal residence permit, over-estimation of 
both probabilities also gives rise to the expected effects: overestimating the probability of 
obtaining a legal permit after arrival in Europe has a positive significant effect on the 
probability of migration, whereas overestimating the probability of dying en route to Europe has 
a significant negative effect on the decisions to migrate.  
Table 6A further shows that for those who overestimate the probability of obtaining a 
legal permit, the impact of additional increases in the probability of a permit will have a positive 
significant effect, but lower than the impact on those who underestimate this probability. In this 
same instance where subjects overestimate the probability of a permit, an increase in the 
probability of dying en route seems to have a negative effect, but this cannot be statistically 
distinguished from the effect of this probability on those who underestimate the probability of 
obtaining a permit.  
Similarly, in Table 6B, we observe that for those overestimating the probability of dying 
en route, the marginal effects of increased probabilities of obtaining a permit and of dying en 
route have the expected signs but cannot be distinguished from the effect of those probabilities 










HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS BASED ON EXPECTED PERMIT 
 





Prob. of permit 0.1094*** 0.0806*** 
 (0.0236) (0.0171) 
Prob. of dying -0.1007*** -0.0759*** 
 (0.0373) (0.0230) 
Overestimate prob. of permit 0.1448*** 
(0.0452) 
 








Constant 0.2993*** 0.3761*** 
 (0.0306) (0.0067) 
Individual fixed effects 





Observations 6478 6478 
Note: Regressions estimated using a Linear Probability Model. Migrate irregularly is a binary variable taking 
value 1 if the respondent is willing to migrate irregularly and 0 otherwise. Prob. of permit is the hypothetical 
probability of obtaining a residence permit (or asylum status) in Italy. Prob. of dying is the hypothetical 
probability of dying en route to Italy. Overestimate probability of permit corresponds to subjects with an 
expectation above the actual probability of obtaining a legal residence permit (30 percent). Standard errors in 










HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS BASED ON EXPECTED PROBABILITY  
OF DYING EN ROUTE 
 





Prob. of permit 0.1199*** 0.0916*** 
 (0.0354) (0.0257) 
Prob. of dying -0.1341** -0.1436*** 
 (0.0571) (0.0533) 












Constant 0.4785*** 0.3763*** 
 
Individual fixed effects 







Observations 6478 6478 
Note: Regressions estimated using a Linear Probability Model. Migrate irregularly is a binary variable taking value 
1 if the respondent is willing to migrate irregularly and 0 otherwise. Prob. of permit is the hypothetical probability 
of obtaining a residence permit (or asylum status) in Italy. Prob. of dying is the hypothetical probability of dying en 
route to Italy. Overestimate probability of dying corresponds to subjects with an expectation above the actual 
probability of dying en route (20 percent). Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level. * p < 
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c. Are experimental subjects behaving rationally? 
A final check on the robustness of our findings is to evaluate whether experimental decisions 
to migrate are rational in the sense of net income maximizing. 
According to the neoclassical theory of migration initially put forward by Sjaastad 
(1962), the decision to migrate is governed by utility maximization based on expected net 
income flows. Individuals migrate if their expected net income from migration is positive. 
Using our experimental setup, we can compute the expected net income of migrating 
irregularly. Our experimental set up assumes that individuals face two types of wages: a 
monthly wage of EUR 1000 for those who have a legal residence permit, and EUR 500 for 
those without a permit. To compute the expected benefit of migrating for each round, we 
employ the respective probabilities of dying and chances of obtaining permit applied in each 
round. Similarly, we compute the expected benefit of staying in Gambia. We assume that 
individuals who choose to stay in the country are faced with the existing labor market 
outcomes and earn their reported salary or the average national monthly salary of people in 
rural Gambia. Although negligible compared to the risk of dying en route, 25-year old males 
who live in rural areas of the country are also faced with a non-trivial 0.35 percent risk of 
dying according to the 2013 census.17 We used this fatality rate to compute the benefit of 
staying put instead of migrating. Additionally, for computational purposes, we assume the 
cost of migration to be EUR 2000; the gain from dying en route or dying in the country to 
have a zero payoff; and the migration period to last for ten years. Finally, for discounting 
purposes, we utilized the average lending rate of 22.63 percent published by the central bank 
at the time of the survey (May 2017).  
The computation exercise yields an average net present gain from migration of EUR 
29,311 if we assume the reported individual monthly salary of our respondents; EUR 29,185 
assuming the average monthly salary of GMD 2000; and EUR 28,027 when we utilize the 
national monthly average of GMD 3000. 
How does this affect experimental subjects’ decisions to migrate irregularly? In other 
words, are respondents behaving rationally, i.e., are respondents choosing to migrate when 
the net grain of migrating is positive? The descriptive results suggest that the respondents 
are indeed behaving rationally, in that in all the 38 cases with a negative net gain of 
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migration, only one was willing to migrate irregularly (2 percent). When we analyze the 
cases in which the expected net gain of irregular migration was positive, we observe that 41 
percent are willing to migrate irregularly. Table 7 below shows the impact of the net gain of 
migration on the willingness to migrate. Depending on which assumptions are made when 
computing the benefit of staying in the country, we observe an increase in the willingness to 
migrate of about 11 percent for every 1 percent increase in the expected net gain of 
migration. It is worth highlighting that our assumption of zero payoff for the death outcome 






WILLINGNESS TO MIGRATE IRREGULARLY AND EXPECTED NET  
GAIN OF MIGRATION 
 







ln(NPV1) 0.1082***   
 (0.0155)   
    
ln(NPV2)  0.1109***  
  (0.0123)  
ln(NPV3)   0.1050*** 
   (0.0117) 
Constant -0.7034*** -0.7281*** -0.6621*** 









Notes: Regressions estimated using a Linear Probability Model. Migrate irregularly is a binary 
variable taking value 1 if the respondent is willing to migrate irregularly and 0 otherwise. NPV1 is 
estimated using the individual reported monthly wage, NPV2 is done with the average monthly wage 
of GMD 2000, and NPV3 uses the national average monthly wage rate of GMD 3000. Standard errors 
in parentheses, clustered at the individual level. *Significant at 10 percent; **significant at 5 percent; 
***significant at 1 percent. 
 
 
d. Willingness to pay to migrate and willingness to forgo migration if paid 
As a final robustness check, we examine how the probabilities of dying en route and of 
obtaining a legal permit to stay in Europe affect the willingness to pay for irregular migration 
(though smugglers) and the willingness to receive a payment to forgo migrating irregularly. 
Recall that in the experiment, subjects were hypothetically endowed with GMD 100,000, and 
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migration costs. The measures we use are obtained through this hypothetical, non-incentivized, 
experiment. 
Column (1) of Table 8 describes how the risk of dying en route and the chances of 
obtaining a residence permit affect the amount potential migrants are willing to pay for 
irregular migration costs and the value of the opportunity cost of migrating. These results 
show that the hypothetical probabilities of dying en route have negative but insignificant 
effects on the amount potential migrants are willing to pay for migration costs. However, the 
probability of obtaining a residence permit has a positive and significant effect on this 
amount: a one-percent increase in the chance of obtaining a permit increases the willingness 
to pay for migration by 5.6 percent. Furthermore, in column (2) of Table 8, we observe that 
both the risk of dying and the chances of obtaining a residence permit affect the opportunity 
cost of migrating. The estimated elasticities suggest that for every one-percent increase in 
the risk of dying, the amount potential migrants need to be paid to forgo migration is 
reduced by 9 percent. Similarly, respondents need to be paid up to 6 percent more for every 






RESULTS FROM THE EXPERIMENT: AMOUNT WILLING TO PAY TO MIGRATE AND 
AMOUNT WILLING TO BE PAID TO FORGO MIGRATION 
 
 (1) (2) 
 log (Value Willing to Pay for 
Migration) 
log (Compensation to Forgo 
Migration) 
Prob. of permit 0.0566** 0.0627* 
 (0.0388) (0.0277) 
   
Prob. of dying -0.0001 -0.0903* 
 (0.0559) (0.0517) 
   
Constant 10.765*** 9.5633*** 
 
Individual fixed effects 













R-squared 0.7352 0.9330 
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5. DO LAB MIGRATION DECISIONS REFLECT ACTUAL  
MIGRATION DECISIONS?  
 
An alternative interpretation of the migration choices made by experimental subjects in our 
lab experiment is that they may not translate into actual migration decisions. To check the 
robustness of our findings relative to this concern, we collected follow-up data via telephone 
calls. As is described in Table 9, the research team managed to re-contact 263 out of the 
initial 406 experimental subjects who participated in the lab experiment. This large attrition 
rate may mask the occurrence of more international migration than we could measure in the 
follow-up survey, as it is particularly difficult to track irregular migrants to Europe, even 
though the research team members tried to contact these experimental subjects via social 
media, in addition to telephone contacts.  
Of those we could re-interview, 22 percent had actually migrated, although only 3 
percent had migrated internationally—and mostly to Senegal. In terms of intentions to 
migrate, 77 percent of re-interviewed experimental subjects still intended to migrate in the 
future, although only 33 percent in the following year; also, 33 percent expressed an 
intention to emigrate irregularly. 
The actual decisions and intentions to migrate correlate very significantly with the 
experimental migration decisions, although the magnitude of this correlation is small. As 
displayed in Table 10, reporting experimentally to migrate is associated with an increase by 
1.75 pp in the probability of actual migration, and with an increase of 10.8 pp in the 










DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FROM FOLLOW-UP SURVEY 
 
      
 N Mean SD Min Max 
Migrated 263 .2243346 .4179387 0 1 
Migrated internally 263 .1901141 .3931391 0 1 
Migrated internationally 263 .0342205 .1821418 0 1 
Migrated to Senegal 263 .0304183 .1720626 0 1 
Intends to migrate 248 .766129 .4241471 0 1 
Intends to migrate next year 248 .3266129 .4699227 0 1 
Intends to migrate irregularly 248 .3306452 .4713968 0 1 
Notes: Migrated is a binary variable taking value 1 if the respondent migrated and 0 otherwise. Migrated internally 
takes value 1 if respondent migrated within the country and 0 otherwise. Migrated internationally takes value 1 if 
the respondent migrated outside the country and 0 otherwise. Intent to migrate takes value 1 if the respondent is 








LAB WILLINGNESS TO MIGRATE IRREGULARLY AND FOLLOW-UP ACTUAL 
MIGRATION DECISIONS AND INTENTIONS 
 





Intent to migrate 
next year 
Intent to migrate 
irregularly 








Constant 0.0269** 0.7515*** 0.2994*** 0.2874*** 
 



















R2 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.013 
Notes: Regressions estimated using a Linear Probability Model. Lab willingness to migrate is binary variable 
taking value 1 if respondent is willing to migrate irregularly in the lab-in-the-field experiment, and 0 otherwise. N 
represents total number of observations and n is the total number of respondents. Each individual has maximum of 
16 observations. Standard errors in the parentheses, clustered at the individual level. *Significant at 10 percent; 
**significant at 5 percent; ***significant at 1 percent.  
 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This study aims at improving our understanding of the determinants of the willingness to 




	 	 Bah and Batista   32 
incentivized lab-in-the-field experiment using a sample of 406 households in rural Gambia, 
the country with the largest incidence (as percent of population) of irregular migration to 
Europe. In the incentivized experiment, subjects faced scenarios with differing probabilities 
of successfully reaching Europe, and of obtaining asylum or other residence status that 
would allow them to travel and work legally upon arrival. In each scenario, respondents 
made choices about whether to migrate irregularly, about their willingness to pay for 
migration, and about the amount they were willing to accept in order to forgo migrating.  
Our results suggest that potential migrants overestimate both the risk of dying en 
route to Europe and the probability of obtaining legal residency status. Moreover, on 
average, we found evidence of youth willing to reject a substantial amount of money per 
month to forgo migrating irregularly. Our findings suggest that willingness to migrate 
irregularly is not only affected by the risk of dying en route, but also by the chances of 
obtaining asylum or a legal residence permit. Additional evidence also shows that prior 
expectations may act as important determinants of willingness to migrate irregularly. 
Overall, our study suggests that the migration decisions of potential migrants actively 
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APPENDICES 
 
A1: Lab-In-The-Field-Experiment Framing 
Imagine that you have/given 100,000 Gambian Dalasis (GMD). You can decide what to do with 
the money. You can either keep it or use it migrate to Europe through the “Backway”. Now I 
will give you 16 different scenarios, and for each scenario, you will decide whether you will 
migrate or not, how much you are willing to pay for migration cost, and how much you are 
willing to accept in order to stop migrating. In this game, depending on what you choose to do, 
you stand the chance to win real money at the end of the game.  
For every EUR 20000 (GMD 1,000,000) you win, we will pay you 1-real euro (GMD 
50). You have the opportunity to win a minimum of GMD 5 up to a maximum of GMD 300.  
For example, people who choose not to migrate can keep the gift of GMD 100,000 which is 
equivalent to a payoff of GMD 5. While those who choose to migrate can either win GMD 0 if 
they die along the way, GMD 150 if they reach but do not obtain a permit/asylum. And finally 
those who migrate and obtain a permit win GMD 300. 
Before playing the game, as you may know, migration to Europe while profitable can 
also be risky. The rules of the game are as follows: If you choose to migrate, you can either 
successfully reach to Europe or you will die along the way. This depends on the chances we will 
be providing. All those who successfully reach in Europe, some will have residence 
permit/asylum papers, while others will not. Those who obtain the permit have the opportunity 
to earn more money compared to those who do not. Moreover, the people who obtain the permit 
will also have the opportunity to come visit their family back in Africa.  
At the end of the game, we will randomly choose one scenario from the sixteen 
scenarios to pay you. The case that we choose will determine how much you will earn; therefore 
we advise that you take each decision equally seriously. We will play the chances of dying en 
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A2: Preferences 
Risk Preferences 
Imagine you won a gift of GMD 1,000 without any indication of how you should spend this 
amount. You are now given the possibility to use that money in a game. In this game you can 
win or lose. Usually, in every 10 people who play this game, 5 win and 5 lose. If you win, you 
get 150 percent of the amount invested in the game (GMD 1,500 if you invest GMD 1,000) 
within a year. If you lose, you get half (GMD 500 if you invest GMD 1,000) within a year too. 
You can choose to invest in the whole game (GMD 1,000), only part or nothing. 
 














Time Preferences  
Suppose you have won GMD 100,000 in a lottery. However, the lottery will not pay out the prize to 
you until exactly one year from now. How much are you willing to pay to receive the GMD 
100,000 immediately rather than one year from now? 
 
GMD 
Nothing, I will decline playing 0 
100 Dalasis (GMD) 1 
200  Dalasis (GMD) 2 
300  Dalasis (GMD) 3 
400  Dalasis (GMD) 4 
500  Dalasis (GMD) 5 
600 Dalasis (GMD) 6 
700  Dalasis (GMD) 7 
800  Dalasis (GMD) 8 
900  Dalasis (GMD) 9 
1000  Dalasis (GMD) 10 




	 	 Bah and Batista   37 
APPENDIX FIGURE A1: SHOW CARDS 
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